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Abstract 
Karelia is a forestry-rich region on Russia’s northwestern frontier. This article shows how institutional 
arrangements for local government were a product of contending efforts of western donors and other 
transnational actors, the federal and regional governments, and the municipalities. Russia’s re-centrali-
sing reforms and broader authoritarian context notwithstanding, Karelia illustrates how the choice of lo-
cal institutions, and ideas about representation and citizenship are increasingly shaped by actors beyond 
the central state. Borrowing insights from J.S. Migdal and J.C. Ribot, this article argues that the result is 
shifting cognitive boundaries and ‘fragmented belonging’ in a dynamic process of contestation and re-
contestation of citizenship. 
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INTRODUCTION 
 
OVER THE PAST TWO DECADES, many countries have em-
braced decentralisation as an institutional form that 
would promote efficiency, equity and democracy. The 
logic behind these efforts is that if the right mix of insti-
tutions is in place, ‘genuine’ decentralisation could solve 
many of the problems that local communities face in 
newly democratising and developing contexts. As Ribot 
(2004) poignantly observes, getting to if has proven to be 
a challenge, with many an ostensibly decentralised com-
munity still ‘waiting for democracy’. Indeed, few coun-
tries boast the mix of institutions that arguably makes for 
‘genuine’ decentralisation: democratically elected local 
authorities with their own tax and revenue base and legal 
guarantees for decision-making on locally specific issues. 
 Approximating the ‘if’ scenario, however, has likewise 
proved no panacea against the deeply embedded patterns 
of social exclusion, corruption or inequity plaguing many 
a local community (Crook & Manor 1998; Lankina 
2004). Regular democratic elections do not always make 
the mayors or councillors more accountable to local pop-
ulations; and increasing the localities’ revenue base 
sometimes serves to transpose the corruption ‘patholo-
gies’ of the centre to the local level (Carothers 1999).  
 These facts have been a source of frustration for decen-
tralisation advocates. Compounding these frustrations is a 
failure to locate decentralisation in the broader contempo-
rary contexts. Democratic decentralisation is meant to 
strengthen citizenship and ‘belonging’ in the nation state 
and ensure that local governments have adequate re-
sources to promote social equity. And yet, scholars now 
question and redefine the very meanings of citizenship 
faced with globalisation and other external influences on 
the nation state. Irrespective of whether the effects of 
these developments are positive or negative, they have to 
be factored into the analyses of decentralisation.  
 Modern conceptions of citizenship, intricately tied to 
those of the nation state, include a bundle of rights that 
populations in western democracies incrementally at-
tained over the last two centuries. Sparke (2004) distin-
guishes three key forms of citizenship: civil citizenship, 
such as the right to protection of private property and 
freedom of market access; political citizenship, such as 
the right to vote and run for office and; social citizenship, 
the guarantee of basic social necessities for a decent stan-
dard of living. In many decentralising settings, local gov-
ernments have been faulted for being unprepared for, or 
incapable of, adequately serving these goals of advancing 
citizenship. Local governments indeed often lack formal 
powers for advancing civil citizenship as the respective 
authority is often vested with the national government. 
Local council electoral rules often do not ensure broad-
based citizen representation and the local authorities’ fi-
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nancial powers are usually weak; hence, the inadequacy 
of social services provision.  
 And yet all of these issues are at the core of the debates 
about the weaknesses of the modern democratic polity as 
a whole. Neo-liberalism and the imposition of market-
based forms of governance have arguably strengthened 
the power of big business at the expense of citizen rights. 
These tendencies have also arguably resulted in the cur-
tailing of social programmes in western democracies. Fi-
nally, in many democracies citizens feel they cannot 
influence the government through the ballot box (Sparke 
2004). 
 In addition to these substantive aspects of citizenship, 
which bind ruler and ruled in a web of mutual rights and 
obligations, citizenship is also about national and local 
identity, or what Ribot (2007) refers to as belonging. Ri-
bot suggests that here too local governments are to play a 
pivotal role, fostering an integrated public domain and 
residency-based forms of citizenship in, and identifica-
tion with, the wider polity (Ribot 2004, 2007). As at the 
advent of modernity, local governments are there to help 
turn ‘peasants into Frenchmen’ (Weber 1976). Particu-
larly in developing settings, a democratically elected vil-
lage council, it goes, should help overcome the ethnic, 
sectarian or gender tensions and social structures of ex-
clusion by fostering a broader civic-based identity.  
 The world we are dealing with now, however, is far 
removed from the one that Weber (1976) describes, a fact 
that scholars of decentralisation underestimate. In his es-
say on the deconstruction of the notion of identity in our 
current world, Migdal (2004: 5) rightly discerns: ‘Many 
studies . . . , continue to remain fixed and thematized at 
the level of the spatial and the geopolitical associated 
with the nation state’. The mass media that succeeded in 
turning villagers into good national citizens at the advent 
of the modern age, as described by Weber, are now erod-
ing the notions of belonging to one bounded space. The 
‘mental maps’ that people construct for self-
identifications, are as much products of socialisation in 
their home country, as of absorbing information, imagery 
and experience derived from other sources, be they local 
or global (Migdal 2004).  
 Not only are the ‘mental boundaries’ redefined through 
contact with the world beyond the bounded state, but this 
world is also affecting the social, legal and other frame-
works deemed previously the nearly exclusive domain of 
the national government. Nowhere is this more evident 
than at the local level. Just as the local was once central 
to the success of the national project, it may now prove to 
be a crucial aspect in its undoing. This is because porous 
borders, flexible legal frameworks and markets facilitate 
external actors’ access to regions and localities bypassing 
the national government.  
 Such global-local links are bound to be particularly 
pronounced in resource-rich settings, where the local is 
tied to the global through production and export proc-
esses. In such areas, the local arena might be an object of 
‘neocolonial’ (Lehtinen n.d.) or otherwise exploitative 
practices from without (Steele 2004; Swyngedouw 2004), 
resulting in the ‘politics of democratic disempowerment’ 
by forces in the global economy (Grugel 2003: 262, dis-
cussing Scholte 2000). An example would be tax and 
regulatory concessions leading to the curtailing of social 
programmes that large corporations win from local gov-
ernments using threats of relocation of production (Sparke 
2004). The locals might also suffer from donor efforts 
with ‘questionable political or ideological agendas’ 
(Standing 2004: 1070) that through a selective focus on 
some local actors serve to ‘fragment the public domain’ 
(Ribot 2004). An example would be the support for exter-
nally formed or funded committees or non-governmental 
organisations (NGOs) (Manor 2005), which are there to 
rubber stamp external donor or business preferences irre-
spective of those of elected local bodies.  
 Alternatively, the local setting might benefit from ex-
ternal actor efforts to foster citizenship and strengthen 
democratic local governments. The precise models of 
governance will depend on the actors involved in this 
process, and perceptions of these actors and their choices 
by the local people. In a globalised world, in which de-
mocracy is no longer something mapped straightfor-
wardly ‘onto territorial nation states’ (Grugel 2003: 261), 
there is a whole range of such actors: from transnational 
social movements, to more institutionalised regional and 
global governance regimes (Ingebritsen 2002). They pro-
vide local citizens with alternative norms, resources and 
authority, contending with those of their own states 
(Keck & Sikkink 1998; Mukhopadhyay 2005).  
 Geographic proximity of localities to economic and po-
litical heavyweights is even more likely to encourage 
such governance characterised by ‘trans-territorial’ and 
‘multi-territorial’ problem solving (Higgott 2005: 585). 
These efforts need not be solely motivated by the devious 
‘neocolonial’ (Lehtinen n.d.) logic of resource extraction. 
Such mega-players as the European Union (EU) tend to 
pursue external good governance efforts for environ-
mental, poverty alleviation, security or democracy rea-
sons (Lankina 2005).  
 Territorial proximity also works to make the locals 
themselves receptive to such influences. Although bor-
ders separate them from external players, such localities 
are more appropriately conceptualised as a ‘frontier’; 
rather than being sites of separation, they create opportu-
nities for exchange and interaction, ultimately helping re-
define the cognitive and practice boundaries separating 
‘us’ from ‘them’ (Hibou 2004; Migdal 2004). In local 
governance, cognitive shifts would reflect local people’s 
perceptions of legitimacy or effectiveness of external ver-
sus domestic templates, and in practice, efforts to emulate 
those they find most appealing. 
 The national level will continue to have tremendous sa-
lience and local governments will be still influenced by 
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national laws and regulations. And yet particularly on a 
geographic frontier, the boundaries separating the domestic 
from the external will tend to become fuzzier when exter-
nal actor efforts lead to greater institutional ‘isomor-
phism’ (Krasner 1995) or convergence between the local 
and the external, and when the ‘mental maps’ (Migdal 
2004) favour the external over the domestic. Rather than 
being passive recipients of imposed institutional choices 
by national governments and foreign donors, the locals 
are here seen as active agents in the dynamic processes of 
contestation and re-contestation of institutions, identities 
and belonging (Chhatre, this volume). These processes 
are illustrated in the forestry-rich Republic of Karelia. 
 The article is structured as follows: section two discusses 
the history of Karelia and the contexts shaping its current 
institution building, section three focuses on Karelia’s lo-
cal government development in the 1990s and section 
four analyses the impacts of domestic and external actor 
institutional choices on local understandings of democracy. 
The conclusion discusses the implications of the conflict-
ing institutional dynamics for democratic citizenship.  
 
KARELIA IN THE BROADER CONTEXTS 
 
Karelia’s historical legacies, frontier status and forestry 
resources affected the constellation of actors shaping its 
local government, which contrasts with that of many oth-
er Russian regions. 
 Over 80 per cent of Karelia’s territory is covered with 
forest. During the Cold War, Karelia’s location on the 
USSR’s (Union of Soviet Socialist Republics) border 
with non-communist Europe blocked access to forests in 
the heavily guarded border zone. Accordingly, along the 
Finno-Russian border Karelia boasts some of the best 
preserved boreal forests in Europe. Outside of the 700 km 
border zone, however, the Soviet government set up tim-
ber industries. Currently, approximately 60 per cent of 
Karelia’s industrial output comes from timber logging, 
wood processing and paper pulp industries, with most of 
production outputs going to Europe (Zimin 2004).  
 Karelia is one of Russia’s eighty-nine administrative 
regions (several regions are now being merged). The re-
gion has a historical legacy of ties to Finland, the latter 
being itself formerly part of the Russian empire. Geo-
graphically, Karelia straddles territories in Russia and 
Finland, hence the distinction between Russian and Fin-
nish Karelias (Paasi 1996).  
 Similar to the other ethnically defined republics in the 
Russian Soviet Federated Socialist Republic (RSFSR), 
Karelia occupied a higher status compared to the non-
ethnically defined oblasti. The republics were created in 
the context of Stalin’s nationalities policies according to 
which the recognised ethnic groups, such as the indige-
nous Karely, were entitled to a ‘homeland’ region.  
 The USSR’s collapse in 1991 raised concerns that Rus-
sia would also follow suit and splinter. In the early 1990s, 
the republics used potential secession from Russia as a 
bargaining chip, ultimately securing important power 
sharing prerogatives from Moscow, such as authority to 
manage natural resources and relative freedom in their in-
ternal institutional choices.  
 These developments should be situated in the broader 
regional and international contexts. As in the other post-
communist states, western donors became active in Rus-
sia. The EU was particularly influential in this process. 
The regional dimension was a crucial component of EU 
aid involvement for security and other reasons. A focus 
on geographically close areas was meant to mitigate such 
negative spillover effects of the ‘problem’ neighbour as 
environmental pollution, crime or human trafficking. Re-
gional involvement also reflected a philosophy of sub-
national development that arguably made the EU project 
itself tick. Within Europe, regionalisation was seen not 
only as a means to mitigate minority nationalisms, but al-
so to foster social cohesion. As a form of confidence 
building among nations formerly at war, the concept of a 
Euro region straddling national boundaries, likewise be-
came a major policy success. With the Cold War over, 
these conceptions were to be applied to the post-
communist east so as to turn ‘curtains of iron’ into those 
of ‘gold’ (Paasi 1999).  
 For Karelia, the significance of these efforts was mag-
nified due to its location on the Finnish border. Rather 
than contesting and reifying the political boundaries sepa-
rating Russia and Finland, much of the discourse among 
the Finnish policy and academic elite conceptualised the 
area as a frontier. While borders or boundaries have a 
more formal meaning as lines of separation between two 
states, frontiers lack clear demarcations and are instead 
conceived of as a meeting place of networks, cultures and 
societies (Paasi 1999). The most local units—individuals, 
communities, townships—become important to this con-
ception; the more points of contact among them, the more 
they underline fuzziness of the frontier, the overlapping 
and transcending nature of space and boundaries. 
 The loose constellation of centre-regional relations in 
Russia, the EU’s developmental philosophy and the pecu-
liarities of Finnish conceptions of Karelia, these were the 
broader contexts in which Karelia’s post-communist in-
stitutional development unfolded. The following section 
turns to the discussion of Karelia’s local government tra-
jectory as shaped by these factors. 
 
LOCAL GOVERNMENT DEVELOPMENT: THE 
POLITICS OF CHOICE 
 
Local Authority, National Frameworks and  
International Aid 
 
Until 1995, the national frameworks for local government 
in Russia continued to be amended versions of Soviet 
laws and decrees. In 1995, the federal government 
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adopted a new law, which survived until 2003. The 1995 
legislation was rather general in nature. It mandated the 
separation of local government from state authority and 
allowed the regions to have local institutional arrange-
ments of their choosing. The vagueness of the law was 
only matched by the degree of federal enforcement with 
many regions violating even the most basic provision of 
separation of local government from state power. The re-
sult was a patchwork of institutional arrangements, which 
varied from region to region and ranged from Soviet style 
administrative hierarchies with powers of appointment 
and dismissal leading up to the regional governor, to 
elected authorities with meaningful powers and autonomy 
from regional bodies. It is important to note here that the 
republics were not usually among the latter group of re-
gions. While invoking ‘freedom’ and ‘sovereignty’ in 
their own struggles with the federal centre, they were 
themselves eager to tramp on local government powers 
and institutionalise its dependence on regional authority.  
 Karelia, however, did not fit into this pattern, a con-
trast with other regions that our study will hopefully help 
explain. In the 1990s it emerged as one of the leaders in 
local government development, although it did face many 
of the same problems plaguing local governance else-
where. Still, in comparative terms, Karelia’s local gov-
ernment is more developed than in most of Russia’s other 
regions (Gel’man et al. 2002). Until the most recent fed-
eral re-centralising reforms, Karelia maintained democ-
ratically elected local authorities at all levels. This 
contrasted with many other regions where local execu-
tives were governor appointees or were otherwise subor-
dinate to the regional authorities. In a comprehensive 
study, which ranked regional democratic performance, 
Karelia likewise emerged at the top of the list (Petrov 
2005). 
 As in the other regions, Karelia’s local government ar-
rangements were a product of contending influences: fed-
eral, regional and local. What makes Karelia stand out is 
the role of external actors, EU in particular, in providing 
a menu of local institutional options and resources for lo-
cal development. The EU and other European bodies, 
such as the Council of Europe, accord special importance 
to democratically constituted and socially responsive mu-
nicipalities. This is reflected in a special Council of Eu-
rope Charter and EU Technical Assistance to the 
Commonwealth of Independent States (TACIS) pro-
grammes in Russia aimed at municipal development 
(Lankina 2005). The Nordic states, which have been ac-
tive in Karelia, also boast some of the highest levels of 
municipal autonomy among democratic nations. They 
have been keen to export their models to post-communist 
neighbours—with both EU moneys and their national 
funds. 
 Studies of foreign aid suggest that a proclaimed goal of 
decentralisation does not always match the realities of the 
actors being empowered on the ground. Under the banner 
of democracy promotion, it has been argued, western ac-
tors support private bodies, civil society organisations or 
deconcentrated state authorities operating at a local level 
(Ribot 2004). Resource-rich areas or those designated as 
nature reserves have been arguably particularly prone to 
such politics of local government non-choice—in which 
local governments are avoided by outside actors (Ribot 
2004; Spierenburg et al. this volume).  
 To what extent did external choices in Karelia mirror 
these patterns? In order to address this question, the au-
thor constructed a dataset of EU projects conducted in the 
regions from 1991 to 2005. In its aid projects, the EU dis-
tinguishes between federal and regional components. 
Federal projects cover policies of national significance. 
In the regional component, the EU specifically targets lo-
cal agencies. Federal actors may be involved, but only if 
a project includes several regions and requires federal co-
ordination, or if it is of federal significance (Interview 
with Aleksandr Berdino, Director, TACIS Regional Sup-
port Office, Petrozavodsk, 5 July 2004). 
 The dataset distinguishes between federal bodies, re-
gional and local governments, NGOs, universities and 
private agencies. It shows that the EU targets both the re-
gional bodies and municipalities for donor assistance. 
The record varies from region to region, but Karelia in 
particular stands out for a large share of projects aimed at 
municipal development. It was the main beneficiary in 
seventy EU funded projects. The local government shared 
the first place with the regional government as the bene-
ficiary of the largest number of projects, twenty-four. 
NGOs were listed as main beneficiaries in only seven 
projects, and federal actors, in two. In terms of volumes 
of funding, regional bodies emerge at the top of the list, 
which is explained by the larger scale of projects they are 
involved with. The data for Karelia contrasts with nation-
wide data on the regional component of EU aid, with local 
government occupying only the sixth place in terms of the 
number of projects in which it served as a key partner.1  
 Examination of project activity and interviews with 
TACIS offices staff, as well as with local grantees, also 
suggests that donors stress cooperation between local 
governments and non-state local actors in project assis-
tance.2 These project records are a reflection of continen-
tal Europe’s own governance patterns. Unlike the United 
States of America (USA) with its stress on neo-liberal 
models of governance with a privileged position for mar-
kets and non-state actors, the EU is not averse to work 
with formal democratic institutions like local authorities. 
The social or ‘cohesion’ dimension of citizenship is also 
prominent in EU project activity; many projects target 
municipalities-NGO cooperation in improving local wel-
fare provision or that between local governments and 
trade unions.3 These patterns contrast with American do-
nor assistance; the USA shows preference for work with 
non-state actors like political parties or NGOs (Carothers 
1999). 
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 Finally, the very structure of EU funding privileges lo-
cal governments and forces NGOs to cooperate with them 
(Lankina 2005). Many TACIS projects require the sup-
port of local authorities even when an NGO files an ap-
plication (Interview with Svetlana Shlykova, Regional 
Coordinator, Open World Center, Petrozavodsk, 9 July 
2004). This could range from a signature to commitment 
to participate as one of the project partners. Applications 
also have co-financing requirements of up to 25 per cent 
of the total funding. This likewise encourages partnership 
arrangements; while NGOs are unlikely to meet this re-
quirement due to funding constraints, municipalities have 
the capacity to contribute this share in kind by allocating 
a full-time local government official to run a project or 
providing office premises. As one local official stated, 
co-financing could mean ‘premises for seminars, halls, 
rental payments, communal utility expenses, partly staff 
salaries and so on’ (Interview with Vera Meshko, Chief 
Specialist, Department of External Affairs, Petrozavodsk 
City Administration, 7 July 2004). 
 The official in charge of TACIS projects in Karelia 
thus explained the EU’s preference for work with local 
authorities, as opposed to NGOs:  
 
What kind of salaries do NGO [workers] have? All 
are volunteers, there are no salaries. Here is the 
trick. And the administrations of cities, regions, 
they can allocate staff, they have decent salaries, 
so the co-financing turns out to be decent espe-
cially if many persons are involved (Interview with 
Aleksandr Berdino, Director, TACIS Regional 
Support Office, Petrozavodsk, 5 July 2004). 
 
In many localities, NGOs are dependent on local govern-
ments to begin with, relying on them for premises, utili-
ties and other infrastructure support (Interview with Galina 
Yushkova, Karelian Center for Gender Research, 9 July 
2004). In small towns and villages NGO capacity is even 
weaker than in medium and large towns, and the local au-
thorities tend to serve as broader project umbrella agencies.  
 The substantial aid volumes were instrumental in shap-
ing Karelia’s local government institutions in the 1990s. 
One study, which sought to explain variations in local 
democracy among Russia’s regions in the first post-
communist decade, identified the ‘transboundary factor’ 
as key to explaining Karelia’s local government devel-
opment (Gel’man et al. 2002). This factor was important 
in Karelia’s adoption in 1994, the first among Russian re-
gions, of a democratic law on local government. The law 
specifically took north European institutions as models. 
Another comparative study found that Karelia differed 
from other regions where American donors have been 
more active than EU. It found that Karelia maintains co-
operative and consensual modes of interaction between 
NGOs and local governments, characteristic of continen-
tal Europe (Belokurova & Yargomskaya 2005). 
 The resulting institutional arrangements also played 
into the region specific political dynamics because they 
affected the resource base of the mayors of larger cities, 
who conflicted over power and resources with the re-
gional governor. For example, Gel’man et al. (2002: 230–
231, 245) show how in an effort to extend his power base, 
the mayor of the regional capital tapped into the many 
possibilities of attracting EU grants. The mayor could be 
successful in obtaining grants in competition against 
other municipalities and regional bodies, however, only if 
he could demonstrate the democratic nature of his ad-
ministration and its social and economic performance. 
 Importantly, until the end of the 1990s, when the 
Kremlin maintained more of a hands-off approach to-
wards the regions, the federal government played only a 
marginal role in the process. For example, when the 
mayor of a regional city tried to attract federal funding to 
strengthen his institutional power base, ‘the hope for help 
from the federal centre was in vain, whereas western 
sources turned out to be more effective’. ‘Generally’, 
write Gel’man et al. (2002: 230–231, 245), ‘international 
factors continue[d] to play a certain role in the mainte-
nance of the political autonomy of the city’.  
 
Local Government and Forestry Decentralisation 
 
These aid patterns may have also had an indirect impact 
on governance in the area of forestry management. Our 
research does not support the claim that ‘neocolonial’ raw 
material extraction interests guided the western neigh-
bours’ involvement in the region (Lehtinen n.d.). If any-
thing, donor government policies conflicted with the 
timber related trade and investment interests of their pri-
vate businesses. By supporting local government devel-
opment, donors indirectly endorsed Karelia’s practices of 
‘administrative paternalism’ (Bessudnov 2004): a way of 
encouraging forest enterprises to adopt ‘socially respon-
sible’ business practices. The practice was institutional-
ised in the operation of the forestry commission in charge 
of allocating forestry plots, which included both regional 
authorities and federal bodies. Enterprises that the com-
mission allowed to engage in forestry exploitation were 
selected based upon their pledge to accept social obliga-
tions vis-à-vis the local workforce and broader citizenry 
(Bessudnov 2004). Generally, because enterprises often 
depend on the regional government for preferential tax 
treatment and other privileges, they are vulnerable to re-
gional pressures and have strong incentives to comply.  
 In contrast to regional authorities, local governments 
were not formally endowed with extensive forestry man-
agement authority. The 1997 forest code and the 1995  
local government law vaguely referred to local govern-
ments as ‘participants in forestry relations’ without speci-
fying the respective functions. As with other general 
provisions of this legislation, their interpretation and practi-
cal application varied from region to region. In Karelia, 
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de facto the regional authorities’ backing ensured that  
local administrations enjoyed some leverage in forestry ex-
ploitation decisions. They could pressurise timber compa-
nies operating in their jurisdictions to perform services to 
the local citizenry. These could range from supplying 
households with firewood to survive the harsh northern 
winter, to repairing a roof in the local kindergarten, to 
building heating facilities, roads and other infrastructure. 
 The practices of ‘administrative paternalism’, however, 
in the longer term were instrumental in crowding out both 
the larger federal timber industry competitors, and scar-
ing off foreign investors, mostly from those same Nordic 
states that sponsored developmental projects in the region 
(Zimin 2004).4 Until 2000, the large economic interests 
were actually scarcely interested in penetrating Karelia’s 
timber sector. In recent years, however, they have sought 
to capture this market, controlled by the regional authori-
ties or smaller regional firms (Bessudnov 2004). In this 
they were helped by the federal government reforms 
aimed at re-centralising power and control over natural 
resources. 
 
Re-centralisation and Forestry 
 
The latest federal reforms were a departure from the Yel-
tsin era federalism when the regions enjoyed substantial 
prerogatives in local government institution building and 
natural resource governance. The 2003 local government 
law has sought to introduce greater uniformity of institu-
tional arrangements across all regions. The law had the 
effect of changing the structures of accountability, re-
establishing or reinforcing upward linkages. It provided 
for three main tiers of local authority with popularly 
elected councils: settlements, municipal counties and city 
districts. With regard to the chief local executive, the law 
provided for several options: the (1) ‘mayor-council’ 
model, based on popular election of council deputies and 
city mayors as chief executives; (2) the ‘city manager’ 
model, whereby elected local deputies hire a chief execu-
tive who is nominated by a special commission that in-
cludes regional governor appointees; or (3) a mixed 
model, whereby the elected mayor is reduced to chairing 
the local council, while a hired city manager is vested 
with the powers of chief local executive (Gel’man & 
Lankina 2008). The regions acquired significant influence 
over the appointment of the key local executive in mu-
nicipalities with the city manager type model. The gover-
nor and regional legislature also acquired extensive 
powers in removing even the popularly elected mayors, 
disbanding local councils or setting up temporary re-
gional administrations in the localities.5 
 The politics of dis-empowerment also extended to local 
prerogatives in natural resources. In an effort to re-
acquire control over natural resources and submitting to 
lobbying pressures from large timber industries, the Putin 
administration overhauled previous modes of forestry 
management. In 2004 the government passed an amend-
ment to the forestry code endowing the centre with man-
agement powers over local forests. It also proposed a 
controversial new forestry code. The federal government 
produced successive drafts of the code without any sub-
stantive involvement of the broader public.6 
 The final version of the code, which entered into force 
on 1 January 2007, gave back the powers of forestry 
management to the regional authorities that the 2004 
amendment had deprived them of. The code, together 
with the new local government law, however, provides 
for only marginal involvement of local governments in 
forestry exploitation decision-making, largely limiting it 
to forests already in municipal ownership. According to 
the 2003 local government law, only forests that are with-
in the residential (emphasis added) territory of the lowest 
level of local government authority, or settlements, and of 
urban city districts, are in local government ownership.7 
There are no provisions for forest ownership by larger 
territorial units, the municipal counties. Municipal 
authority that the code refers to therefore covers a limited 
range of forest land that has low economic significance 
and is mostly recreational in nature. 
 Timber industry lobbying of the code is reflected in its 
business first nature. The code provides for auctions, 
whereby the sole criterion is the amount of money offered 
by the highest bidder to state, regional or municipal au-
thorities who decide to auction plots. Alternative ways of 
allocating the land would have been through competition 
or konkursy. In a konkursy, decisions would have been 
based on a bidder’s willingness to take on a set of obliga-
tions related to the social, economic and environmental 
concerns of the local populations. While the code refers 
to municipalities as ‘participants in forestry relations’ en-
dowed with management powers, its article 50.2 forbids 
local and other authorities from making decisions that ‘in 
any way could lead to prohibitions against, limitations 
on, or elimination of, private competition’.8 Any local 
government decision, in an auction or otherwise, related 
to socially equitable and sustainable forestry management 
could be construed as violating this provision. 
 These federal reforms, with their imposition of an ad-
ministrative template on all regions and the disempower-
ment of elected bodies in natural resource management 
were a departure from the ‘formative years’ of Karelia’s 
local government development.  
 
FRAGMENTED BELONGING ON THE FRONTIER 
 
Karelia illustrates how government politics of dis-
empowerment may clash with the more enabling institu-
tional choices of external actors. As frontier region, it 
straddles the discrepancy between western neighbour fos-
tered expectations of what local government should be 
about, and the increasingly authoritarian central state. Al-
though compared to Russia’s other regions, Karelia ranks 
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highly in terms of local democracy, its residents have 
strongly negative and pessimistic opinions about local 
governance. The local is consistently compared and jux-
taposed to western models, to which Karelia had been 
exposed more than any other region. The ‘West’, and 
specifically, EU, Finland and other Nordic states serve as 
reference points shaping local perceptions of Russian 
state and regional policies in Karelia, as indeed the re-
gional government’s choice of institutions and practices 
concerning representation and citizenship. 
 The discussion in this section is framed using Migdal’s 
concept of ‘mental maps’. Migdal refers to mental maps 
as incorporating ‘elements of the meaning people attach 
to spatial configurations, the loyalties they hold, the emo-
tions and passions that groupings evoke, and their cogni-
tive ideas about how the world is constructed’ (Migdal 
2004: 7). Here, ‘mapping’ Karelia’s ‘mental maps’ is im-
portant not in a static sense, but as a means to under-
standing the dynamic and unfolding identity shifts, and 
how they shape past and current practices and institu-
tions. This discussion is based on interviews that the au-
thor conducted in August 2004 and January 2006 with 
local government officials, councillors, NGO activists, 
forestry scientists and the timber business community. 
The timing of the interviews, against the background of 
federal reforms, allows one to discern how institutional 
change is perceived and acted out through locally specific 
and western influenced lenses.  
 Interview data provide insights into the local attitudes 
toward representation, citizenship and belonging. Local 
government officials invoke the West when criticising the 
regional authorities’ top-down manner of decision-
making that neglects the preferences of local elected au-
thorities and when talking about citizen rights, as op-
posed to just obligations vis-à-vis the state. Perceptions 
of local government itself change as donors encourage 
the locals to perceive the local authorities as institutions 
that could have a productive relationship with the local 
community, in collaboration with NGOs, rather than be-
ing simple targets for blame attribution. Expectations of 
local government role in forestry resources management, 
its social cohesion function and relationships with the 
private sector are also shaped by the West. And the na-
tional government is no longer seen as the sole source of 
normative and legal authority. Instead, we see Karelians 
invoking their northern identity, in juxtaposition to the 
centre, and looking outside of their national boundaries in 
search of normative templates and legal solutions to vital 
local issues.  
 Local councillors and mayors expressed frustrations 
with discrepancies between normative ideals of formal ar-
rangements for citizen representation shaped through 
countless training seminars in, and city twinning activi-
ties with Nordic neighbours, and the federal and regional 
politics of disempowerment. A mayor of a municipal dis-
trict, the self-described ‘most progressive mayor in Kare-
lia’ begins the interview with a reference to his training 
in Sweden, ‘probably the most advanced country from the 
point of view of local self-government’. He then contrasts 
Swedish local government with the lack of formal powers 
of his administration and subordination to regional and 
central state agencies:  
 
Here we have centralisation of power and it is 
dangerous to talk openly. As head of the rayon 
[municipal district], my open statements will lead 
to problems for ordinary people. Say, tomorrow 
you will write that I said something against the 
governor, and then someone from the government 
will call and say: ‘Are you crazy, do you have 
mental problems? Go and print a disclaimer in the 
paper, because if you don’t, there are many ways 
we can beat the hell out of you!’ Say, if you need 
fuel, they will [not give funding for it to you] and 
will say: ‘Go ahead and freeze’. In reality, though, 
it is their obligation to give me this money, not 
their right. The possibilities for influencing the 
mayor are colossal. . . Of course, I would like to 
work in a modern [emphasis added] way, whereby 
I could call the top manager [governor, emphasis 
added] from here, or he could call me, in the 
framework of normal business relations, but in re-
ality we haven’t met once, I can’t even technically 
reach him if I were to call (Interview with Alex-
andr Potsikovskiy, Head of Administration of 
Prionezhskiy rayon, Petrozavodsk, 19 January 
2006).  
 
The mayor’s reference point for such statements using the 
western word menedzher for governor (manager) is Swe-
den or other western states symbolising all that is mod-
ern. Other Russian regions, where local government 
practices might be worse than in Karelia, are not used as 
a reference point. The distinction between rights and ob-
ligations is also interesting. It points at the Soviet and 
pre-Soviet Russian tradition of subordinating society and 
individual to the state. The strong belief that he has a 
right to expect certain obligations from the state for his 
constituents as a popularly elected representative of the 
local people is a reflection of a western liberal conception 
of citizenship, and not the reality that he observes in his 
daily practice. 
 Western actors likewise influence ideas about local 
government decision-making involving NGOs and broad-
er publics. This shift in perceptions is illustrated in the 
narratives of an environmental NGO activist, who had re-
ceived grants from Sweden, Finland, the Netherlands and 
other European countries specifically aimed at fostering 
local government links with NGOs and the local commu-
nities. ‘At some point, the Norwegians said we should 
work with municipalities’, recalls the activist citing the 
following example from one of the projects:  
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The task was to gather people for 2 days in the 
rayon centre and discuss sustainable development 
of the rayon. It is rare here that people work with 
local government together and not regard it as a 
conflict zone but a discussion zone instead. People 
tend to come to the local government to start a 
fight, say, when there is no street lighting. And this 
time around too, the planned dialogue started with 
conflict with claims that the village has no safe 
water. People made their complaints, and then the 
local government [official] said: ‘Why do you 
throw garbage on the streets?’ [a practice that 
contributes to bad sanitation in the city] . . . But 
then people started asking questions . . . In the end 
the discussion was very good . . . for the first time 
perhaps as normally there is no dialogue with lo-
cal self-government . . . And the local government 
saw that the people are not lacking in initiative 
(Interview with Ludmila Morozova, Head, Kare-
lian Branch of the All-Russian Society for the Pro-
tection of Nature, Petrozavodsk, 19 January 2006). 
 
In this case the western donor initiated discussion helped 
change citizens’ perception that local government has no 
relationship with the local community, towards a recogni-
tion that it is at least an agency to have a ‘dialogue’ with. 
Such a perception would be vastly at odds with the nor-
mative understandings of local self-government in de-
mocratic western settings, some of which even go as far 
as regarding it as the sum total of the local people’s will. 
Local people’s perception is far removed from expecta-
tions of democratic accountability of popularly elected 
councillors. The dialogue in Karelia is an example of get-
ting one step closer to changing this perception.  
 Western exposure also influences perceptions of local 
and national government role in advancing social citizen-
ship. The European concept of social cohesion is frequently 
inferred in discussions with municipal practitioners and 
other local actors. Awareness of EU cohesion policies shapes 
expectations of local government role in addressing local 
inequities in Karelia. It also shapes perceptions of the 
federal centre’s local government reforms, which are blamed 
for subverting the social component of citizenship.  
 A representative of Karelia’s Association of Munici-
palities, for example, maintained: ‘Decentralisation in 
European Union member states is all about cohesion’. 
The logic of social cohesion, he surmises, is behind the 
recent trend in EU member states of regionalisation. He 
suggests that such spatial consolidation of local authori-
ties into larger units better addresses developmental plan-
ning and redistributive needs of smaller localities. This he 
contrasts with the Russian government’s reform, whereby 
popularly elected local governments had been created at 
village levels, but with no capacity for performing social 
services or managing local resources (Interview with a 
representative of the Association of Municipalities of Ka-
relia, Petrozavodsk, 17 January 2006. The interviewee 
preferred to remain anonymous). The above statement 
may be a misrepresentation of the complexity and diver-
sity of local government arrangements in EU member 
states. It is, nonetheless, illustrative of how policies of 
the western neighbour are held up as a standard against 
which to measure domestic developments. 
 Local actors also invoke the West in references to ‘so-
cially responsive’ business practices in the timber indus-
try. ‘In the West, social partnerships are very developed. 
In Europe, for example’, maintained, Galina Kozyreva, a 
scholar who had been involved in a TACIS-funded study 
of the ‘village sotsium’ in forestry towns in Karelia. ‘It 
would be just for the local level to receive compensation 
[from forestry proceeds]’, she noted (Interview with Ga-
lina Kozyreva, Senior Researcher, Institute of Economics, 
Karelian Regional Chapter, Russian Academy of Sci-
ences, Petrozavodsk, 19 January 2006). 
 The ‘most progressive’ mayor, in whose locality a 
business takeover of a timber plant had occurred resulting 
in lay-offs, fumes that nobody informed him of the 
planned takeover, let alone consulted him. His expecta-
tions of participatory and socially responsive forestry 
management are likewise inspired by his ideas about 
business practices in the West: 
 
Nowadays, a system of relationships is built such 
that the federal structures and law . . . , is all 
about business first. As far as I know in Sweden 
and even in the US . . . the stock exchange ratings 
[of a company] fall when its social parameters 
fall, when an enterprise sheds its social burdens. 
That means something is wrong with that enter-
prise . . . And we don’t have it here. While in the 
West, such social dimensions are very prominent 
(Interview with Alexandr Potsikovskiy, Head of 
Administration of Prionezhskiy rayon, Petro-
zavodsk, 19 January 2006). 
 
Another example of the negativising of the ‘Russian re-
alities’, which refer to both lack of formal local govern-
ment powers to influence resource use, and the lack of 
citizen awareness of their rights, is the local Greens activ-
ist’s critique of the forest code: 
 
The Russian realities will be playing a huge role, 
and they will lead to simple degradation when this 
code is adopted, of forests, will create social is-
sues . . . We think the owner of the forest will not 
care about ecology and social issues. See, on the 
question of social responsibility, we are only be-
ginning to talk about it in Russia . . . Our popula-
tion may not even understand what is happening 
on their land (Interview with Dmitry Rybakov, 
Association of Greens of Karelia, Petrozavodsk, 
19 January 2006). 
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And yet not only do interviews reveal juxtapositions be-
tween the negativised Russia, ‘us’ versus the idealised 
West, ‘them’, but also self-identifications signifying 
greater cognitive proximity to the West. Karelia is fre-
quently identified with the broader geographical ‘north’, 
which is juxtaposed to the central state, in that the former 
espouses more ‘socially responsible’ and environmentally 
sustainable approaches to nature and resources than the 
latter: 
 
We have certain traditions here. The North has 
been traditionally famous for clever, sustainable 
use of resources, and this has to be preserved . . . 
(Interview with a representative of the Association 
of Municipalities, 17 January 2006). 
 
He then goes on to criticise the draft federal forestry 
code, and particularly its provisions on auctions, which 
trample on the principles of socially responsive and sus-
tainable forest use: 
 
Here in the local arena I think there are expecta-
tions that these processes [timber management] 
could be regulated for the benefit of the local peo-
ple, including when someone wins a bid [in an auc-
tion], one can set conditions that he [the bidder] 
builds roads, does something for the social needs. . 
. There are tonnes of issues that could be decided 
with people participation. . . I think we have to 
discuss this code. . . Our federal bodies need to try 
to ensure. . . that the local level could be more ef-
fectively engaged so that the mechanisms of its in-
volvement would be more clearly outlined in the 
forest code. I saw the latest version, and there the 
social component is very weak. It is very general 
with no real impulse for local governments to use 
their right to influence forest use (Interview with a 
representative of the Association of Municipali-
ties, 17 January 2006). 
 
The West is not only invoked in normative understand-
ings about local democracy, which are unattainable in 
practice given ‘Russian realities’; instead, it is looked 
upon as a source of legal authority that might shape for-
mal structures of decision-making within Russia itself. 
The EU forestry certification initiative is a case in point. 
The EU had been pushing for forestry certification partly 
as a way of decreasing illegal logging and ensuring sus-
tainable development.9 Local actors invoke this initiative 
as key to changing the environmental and social dimen-
sion of timber management in Karelia. ‘Maybe forestry 
certification will help reorient the forestry business. . . It 
might be the key factor that will influence this here’, 
maintained a local scholar involved in a study of the so-
cial implications of timber industry restructuring in the 
localities.  
 ‘What you can’t go against is forest certification com-
ing under pressure from Europe. The Finns have long 
adopted thirty-two parameters for certification’, echoed 
an Association of Municipalities practitioner (Interview 
with a representative of the Association of Municipalities 
of Karelia, Petrozavodsk, 17 January 2006). The local 
Greens activist is likewise enthusiastic about the poten-
tially ‘very strong’ influence of certification, including on 
shaping Russia’s timber related legislation. Already, ‘Eu-
rope has voiced its concerns over the draft forest code. 
They [in Europe] understand the importance of heritage’, 
he maintained (Interview with Dmitry Rybakov, Associa-
tion of Greens of Karelia, Petrozavodsk, 19 January 
2006). 
 These discourses are revealing of the ideals, under-
standings and hopes derived from western sources in Ka-
relia. Furthermore, western influences also translate into 
institutional choices and practices. Notwithstanding the 
broader authoritarian context, most recently Karelia 
chose local government institutional arrangements that, to 
a certain extent, reflected the western ideals discussed 
above, while resisting federal efforts at re-centralisation.  
 There is substantial evidence that the national govern-
ment sought to impose a particular local government 
template in the localities. The pro-Putin United Russia 
(UR) party, through its centralised structure with branches 
in all regions, establishment of factions in many regional 
legislatures and co-optation of governors of some seventy 
regions, became a major instrument of the Kremlin local 
government agenda in the regions (Gel’man 2006; Hale 
2006; Goode 2007). 
 According to the new local government law, Karelia 
was to set up new municipal formations by the end of 
2005. Many regions opted for chief executive election by 
the local council from amongst local council deputies. In 
Russia, this practice is considered to be easy to manipu-
late from above.10 Significantly, many of Karelia’s locali-
ties opted for the alternative arrangement of popular 
election of mayors. This choice was pointed out in an in-
terview as an example of Karelia’s more western orienta-
tion by one of the mayors elected according to the new 
legislation.  
 Developments in the regional capital, Petrozavodsk, 
further illustrate the struggles between efforts to preserve 
local autonomy—with western influences playing a 
strong role—and federal and regional attempts at curbing 
it. In 2006, the regional governor, a UR supporter, in-
sisted that the city council amend its charter to eliminate 
popular election of the mayor and reduce the size of the 
council. While the UR deputies endorsed the proposal, 
opposition deputies vetoed it.11 The governor and the UR 
dominated republican legislature then secured the re-
gional court’s decision to dissolve the council. In re-
sponse, the deputies appealed to the Council of Europe. 
Invoking democratic norms and the need to abide by the 
European Charter of Local Self-Government, they also 
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went on hunger strike; some were hospitalised. In March 
2007, the opposition secured a stunning victory in the 
Petrozavodsk council elections. Petrozavodsk thus pre-
served the institutional status quo and the independence 
of its local government (Gel’man & Lankina 2008). 
 
CONCLUSION: INTERNALISING THE 
EXTERNAL 
 
Karelia illustrates that representation and citizenship can-
not be conceptualised solely in national terms. Actors be-
yond the central state contribute to the generation of 
norms and influence local discourse and choices of local 
government arrangements. These trans-boundary proc-
esses have become even more prominent in the era of 
globalisation (Keohane 2002; Grugel 2003).  
 The central state continues to control the procedural 
aspects of local government institutions. If these institu-
tions fail to safeguard the social, civil and political com-
ponents of citizenship, then local actors will look beyond 
their national government for normative reference points 
to back their claims for local empowerment. Multiple ref-
erencing and domestic-external links are now characteris-
tic of governance worldwide (Keck & Sikkink 1998; 
Mukhopadhyay 2005). They are particularly pertinent in 
frontier regions like Karelia. Here formal belonging in a 
closed, predatory and authoritarian state is contrasted 
with the Joneses right across the fence, who are not sim-
ply western, but exemplify all that is best in the West, 
from the Nordic states’ democratic local government 
models, to their social cohesion. 
 Here the imposed central state authority is locked in 
conflict with western actors’ more empowering and ena-
bling normative and institutional frameworks. Does this 
result in ‘fragmented belonging’ (Ribot 2007)? Yes. But 
the authoritarian state associated with Moscow, hundreds 
of miles away, that denies citizenship rights to its own 
nationals may not be any more ‘internal’ than western 
neighbours a stone’s throw away who seek to foster this 
very citizenship. While the liberal project of a ‘national 
society of citizens’ is of questionable appeal for those to 
whom substantive citizenship is denied, new kinds of 
citizenship emerge with new sources of law and authority 
beyond the nation state (Holston & Appadurai 2003: 
297). In the case of Karelia, the proximity to democratic 
neighbours produces local expectations of similar institu-
tional arrangements; a sense of belonging to both Russia 
and to the normative order of the West next door.  
 ‘Mental maps’, while being social constructions, also 
‘mark and maintain the separation between groups’ 
(Migdal 2004). Karelians’ perceptions of local realities in 
juxtaposition to the West appear to be an example of such 
group boundary maintenance: however positive the refer-
ences to the West, it is still ‘them’ versus ‘us’. The dy-
namic nature of such identity boundaries, nevertheless, is 
most evident when ‘competing boundaries, demanding 
different, even contradictory practices and mental images, 
bump against one another. . . And as boundaries do clash 
and people encapsulated by them make choices about 
which demands to follow and which to ignore, those 
boundaries change’, ‘inducing them to choose which 
boundaries, principles and practices to submit to and 
which to violate’. It is in such situations, writes Migdal, 
that ‘one finds sites of social struggle and social change’ 
(Migdal 2004: 13, 23).  
 Karelia’s choice of more democratic local institutions 
illustrates an unfolding social and institutional process 
that resists the wider authoritarian context. Rather than 
being recipients of externally imposed ‘politics of choice 
and recognition’, (Ribot 2004) local people are them-
selves important agents in the choice and transformation 
of local institutions. This makes us optimistic that over 
time Karelia is likely to witness an even more active ‘re-
newal of citizenship and struggles for it’, rather than wal-
low in a ‘more passive sense of entitlement to benefits 
which seem to derive from remote sources’ (Holston & 
Appadurai 2003: 299).  
 
Notes 
 
1. Projects by main beneficiary for Karelia—local governments: 24; 
regional bodies: 24; NGOs: 7; universities: 4; federal bodies: 2; 
unspecified: 2; think tank: 1. Breakdown for all Russian regions—
university: 283; regional bodies: 246; NGOs: 184; federal bodies: 
139; private agencies, such as corporations and utility companies: 
137; local government: 124; unspecified: 23; think tank: 9; 
schools: 2. Source: author-compiled from data available at: 
http://62.38.207.105/tacis/en/index.asphttp://www.tacis-lso-
rf.org/en/objectives.asp (accessed 15 November 2005). 
2. Interviews in Petrozavodsk with Tatyana Klekacheva, Executive 
Director, Swedish Karelian Business and Information Center, 9 
July 2004; Galina Yushkova, Karelian Center for Gender Re-
search, 9 July 2004; Irina Nazarova, Project Coordinator, Informa-
tion Office and Contact Centre, Nordic Council of Ministers, 7 
July 2004; Vera Meshko, Chief Specialist, Department of External 
Affairs, Petrozavodsk City Administration, 7 July 2004.  
3. For example, a Swedish project working with trade unions aimed 
at combating alcohol use on the workplace. Tatyana Klekacheva. 
4. Top participant countries—Germany: 203; Finland: 181; UK: 159; 
France: 141; Netherlands: 70; Italy: 68; Belgium: 51; Denmark: 
46; Sweden: 45; Austria: 30. 
5. Law on The Common Principles for Organizing the Legislative 
and Executive Branches of State Power in the Russian Regions.  
6. And forestry experts. Interviews with Alexey Yaroshenko, Forest 
Campaign Coordinator, Greenpeace Russia, Moscow, 2 February 
2006 and Andrei Gromtsev, Vice Director for Science, Forest Re-
search Institute of the Karelian Research Center of the Russian 
Academy of Sciences, Petrozavodsk, 16 January 2006. 
7. Article 50. Available from http://www.rg.ru/2003/10/08/zakons-
amouprav.html (accessed 1 August 2007). 
8. Available from http://www.duma.gov.ru/cnature/workgroups/ 
les/les_kod.htm (accessed 1 August 2007). 
9. See Paavo Pelkonen, ‘Nachalas’ razrabotka initsiativy Barentseva 
regiona po lesnoi otrasli’, University of Joensuu, http://www.web-
studio.fi/vyh/archive/2002_1/juttu551.htm (accessed 1 May 2006) 
10. Assessments of merits of the respective institutions should be 
grounded in specific contexts. The empirical record is mixed. I am 
grateful for this point to Ashwini Chhatre.  
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11. On the protests, see http://www.newsinfo.ru/news/2006/04/ 
prn_news1311791.php?id_r= (accessed 15 June 2006).  
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